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Abstract 
To estimate the cost of a data breach to the inflicted firm, this study examines the relationship between 
a breach incident and changes in the inflicted firm’s profitability, perceived risk, and the inflicted 
firms’ information environment transparency. Profitability is measured as reported earnings and 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. Perceived risk is measured as reported stock return volatility and 
dispersion among analysts’ forecasts. Although a number of studies have investigated the stock market 
reaction surrounding the disclosure of a breach incident to quantify the cost associated with breaches, 
we argue that there exists information uncertainty and deficiency in the disclosure of the breach 
incident and stock market reaction surrounding a security breach announcement date may not be the 
best measure for the cost of security breaches. And research using other complementary measures is 
warranted.   Our preliminary finding suggests that data breaches negatively impact firm profitability, 
perceived risk and information transparency. Nevertheless, the damage of a breach most likely stems 
from direct costs such as compensation and litigation costs rather than indirect costs such as 
tarnished reputation and a decrease in market share and sales. More sophisticated analysts are also 
found to add value in estimating the real cost of a security breach. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The popular press is replete with high profile data security failures. In some incidents, the breached 
firms clearly paid a dear price for their data security debacles. For instance, after criminals accessed 
over 163,000 consumer credit reports, Choicepoint was forced to pay $15 million in penalties and the 
company’s stock price fell from $46.01 to $37.64. However, some press reports suggest that breaches 
are simply becoming an inevitable part of conducting business and are hence nuisances with 
inconsequential economic effects on the afflicted firms (Campbell et al. 2003). To quantify the 
economic costs due to a data security breach, a number of studies have examined the stock market 
responses to the disclosure of data breaches at publicly traded US corporations. Although some have 
found evidence that the stock market responds negatively to news of a data security breach (Cavusoglu 
et al. 2004; Garg et al. 2003), others  suggests that the news of such incidents does not necessarily 
portend a drop in the breached firm’s stock price (Campbell et al. 2003; Hovav & D'Arcy 2003).  
In addition to societal costs, a data security breach results in both direct and indirect costs for the 
inflicted firm.  Direct costs of data breaches include the cost of damage restitution and litigation. 
Indirect costs include the increased cost of conducting business, loss of brand image, loss of customer 
trust, and ultimately a loss in market share and sales. While some costs are easier to quantify, others 
are not. Information deficiency and uncertainty often plague investors amidst data security breach, 
given the lengthy delay for the real magnitude of the breach to be known and the general absence of 
meaningful disclosure about the estimated economic consequences of the breach. This raises the 
question of whether investors are able to accurately estimate the economic impact of a breach at time 
of the announcement. Thus, studies using other measures to quantify the economic costs associated 
with data security breaches are thus warranted.  
Therefore, instead of examining the stock market reaction via cumulative abnormal returns 
surrounding a security breach announcement date, this study examines whether a data security breach 
would lead to expected changes in profitability (measured as reported earnings and analysts’ earnings 
forecasts), risk (measured as dispersion among analysts’ forecasts), and the inflicted firms’ 
information environment (disclosure transparency). The profitability measures capture the impact of a 
security breach on cash flow due to legal costs and the adverse financial consequences from 
customers, investors, employees, and business partners. The risk and information environment 
measures, on the other hand, capture the impact of a security breach on the cost of capital due to new 
uncertainties with regard to the magnitude and implication of future legal sanction, possible 
restructuring costs, executive turn over, and changes in the terms with customers and suppliers.  
This study differs from prior studies in several important ways. First, given that the real magnitude and 
economic implication of a data security breach may only be known several months following the 
breach, it is important to examine the longer term (cumulative change in reported quarterly earnings 
for the one year following the announced security breach) as well as the immediate (revisions in 
analysts’ quarterly earnings forecast in proximity to the announced security breach) economic 
consequences of a security breach. Second, this study examines financial analysts’ earnings forecast 
rather than stock market responses.  It is reasonable to assume that financial analysts have the potential 
to compensate for information deficiencies and their forecasts of earnings incorporate information not 
included in the breach announcement disclosed to the investors. Thus, the use of analysts’ forecasts of 
earnings may add additional value in the estimation of the economic cost associated with data security 
breaches.   Finally, the study argues that a full understanding of the cost associated with security 
breaches requires the inclusion of the risk measure because when a risky firm incurs higher cost of 
capital. Given these differences, this research makes two important contributions to the literature on 
data security breaches. By using complementary dependent variables, this research has the potential to 
confirm the internal and ecological validity of the findings from prior studies. Second, the use of 
multiple rather than a single measure will provide a deeper and fuller understanding of the economic 
damages associated with security breaches.  
  
2 THE LITERATURE AND EMPIRICAL PREDICTION 
Losses and damages due to data security breaches are remarkably complex to measure 
(Acquisti et al. 2006; Kannan et al. 2007).  In their effort to help firms quantify such damages, several 
studies have adopted an event study approach and examined market responses to firms’ data security 
breaches announcements. However, the results are mixed and the losses associated with data security 
breaches remain unclear.  
Telang and Wattel (2007) conduct a study on the disclosure of the vulnerabilities of software 
and show that software vendors lose around 0.6% of their market value when the vulnerability is 
reported. Garg et al. (2003) and  Goel and Shawky (2009) include a broader category of breaches and 
observe a statistically significant negative return around the breach event date. Focusing on events 
involving the potential exposure of confidential data, Acquisti et al. (2006) and Gatzlaff and 
McCullough (2010) suggest that the overall effect of a data breach on shareholder wealth is negative 
and statistically significant. Acquisti et al. (2006) also suggest that the cumulative negative effect 
increases in magnitude over the day following the breach announcement, but then decreases and loses 
statistical significance. Focusing on internet breaches, Cavusoglu et al. (2004) demonstrate that 
announcing an Internet security breach is negatively associated with the market value of the 
announcing firm. 
By contrast, Hovav and D’Arcy (2003) examine the stock market’s response to denial of 
service attack announcements and do not find any significant loss in value for the breached firms. 
Focusing on malicious breaches, Campbell et al. (2003) do not find evidence for an overall negative 
stock market response to public announcements of information security breaches. However, they do 
find a highly significant negative market reaction for information security breaches involving 
unauthorized access to confidential data, but no significant reaction when the breach does not involve 
confidential information. Focusing on a broad category of breaches, Kannan et al. (2007) suggest that 
the breached firms do not earn significantly negative long or short term abnormal returns. They also 
find that during the dot.com era breached firms experienced higher negative short-term abnormal 
returns. However, investor reactions do not differ between smaller and large firms or between 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability related breaches. 
 Unlike other studies, Ko and Dorantes (2006) use a matched-sample comparison analysis to 
investigate the impact of security breaches on a variety of accounting measures. Similarly, Ko and 
Dorantes’s (2006) study yielded mix results. The adverse impacts of the breach incidents are only 
observed in some measures (return on asset), but not in others (sales and operating income).  
Researchers attribute the conflicting evidence observed to the relatively small sample sizes 
used in many studies and the diversity of breaches examined by prior studies (Gatzlaff & McCullough, 
2010). Indeed,  prior studies suggest that the magnitude and direction of the stock price response to the 
news of data security breaches depends on contextual factors such as the nature of the breach (the 
severity of the breaches, confidentiality vs. non-confidentiality related breaches), firm characteristics 
(small vs. large firms, internet vs. brick-and-motor firms), and the incident date (earlier years vs. 
recent years) (Acquisti et al. 2006; Campbell et al. 2003; Gatzlaff & McCullough, 2010; Hovav & 
D'Arcy, 2003; Telang, 2007). Given that risk assessment is a fundamental component in establishing 
data security policies and controls (Hovav & D'Arcy, 2003), these conflicting findings call for more 
research to provide more comprehensive measurement of the economic consequences and validate 
whether data security breaches do indeed lead to negative economic consequences for the inflicted 
firms.  
Inferred from past research on the economic impacts of security breaches, we conjecture that a breach 
incident will negatively impact the inflicted firm’s profitability, perceived risk, as well as the 
perceived information transparency. 
H1. A security breach will have a significant negative effect on the inflicted firm’s profitability.  
H2. A security breach will have a significant negative effect on the perceived risk of the inflicted 
firm from the investors.  
  
H3. A security breach will have a significant negative effect on the inflicted firm’s information 
transparency. 
3 METHODOLOGY AND MEASURES 
We draw data from academic publications listing security breach incidents as well as public databases 
that collect data security breach incident announcements. The initial search yields an initial sample of 
5,008 breach incident announcements. Firms that are not included in the Centre for Research in 
Security Prices and Standards and Poor’s COMPUSTAT databases are eliminated from further 
analyses because these two databases are the primary data sources for stock returns and financial data.  
In order to define the cumulative profitability change variables, firms are required to have five 
consecutive quarters of data starting from the quarter during which the data breach announcement is 
made. This requirement limits our data to 233 announcements. In analyses requiring analysts’ earnings 
forecasts, firm-quarter observations that are not in the Institutional Brokers’ Estimation System 
database, have no revision of earnings forecast from any analyst for the fiscal period within the 
designated post-breach announcement period are further removed. 1  Additionally, to ensure that the 
observed changes in analysts’ earnings forecasts are related to the data security breach incident rather 
than other events, announcements with confounding events during the two week period surrounding 
the announcement date are removed. The final sample size for the analyses requiring only firm 
financial data (as in Table 1) is 174 breach cases (870 firm-quarter observations). In analyses requiring 
analysts’ earnings forecasts, the final sample is 57 breach announcements with 951 quarterly earnings 
forecasts in the 90-day period before the breach announcement and 1,049 quarterly earnings forecasts 
in the 90-day period after the breach announcement.   
The first profitability measure is the quarterly cumulative change in total net earnings for the one year 
period following the announced security breach. For inflicted firm i, the cumulative change of 
quarterly net earnings is the future fourth quarter’s net earnings minus the breach announcement’s 
current quarter’s net earnings, normalized by the absolute value of the current quarter’s net earnings: 
∆ܰܧ௜ ൌ ൫ܰܧ௜,ொସ െ ܰܧ௜,ொ଴൯/|ܰܧ௜,ொ଴| 
The second profitability measure is the quarterly cumulative change in Earnings per Share before 
Extraordinary Items (EPSFX) for the one year period following the announced security breach: For 
inflicted firm i the cumulative change of quarterly EPSFX is defined as the future fourth quarter’s 
EPSFX minus the breach announcement’s current quarter’s EPSFX, normalized by the absolute value 
of the current quarter’s EPSFX: 
∆ܧܲܵܨ ௜ܺ ൌ ൫ܧܲܵܨ ௜ܺ,ொସ െ ܧܲܵܨ ௜ܺ,ொ଴൯/|ܧܲܵܨ ௜ܺ,ொ଴| 
The last profitability measure is financial analysts’ cumulative earnings forecast (EPS before 
Extraordinary Items, corresponding to the previous EPSFX) revisions of the next fiscal quarter in to 
the 90-day period following the announced security breach: 2 For inflicted firm i that has N analysts’ 
research coverage, the cumulative revision of quarter-ahead net earnings forecast is defined as: 
ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ_ܴ݁ݒ݅ݏ݅݋݊௜ ൌ ෍ ൫ܧܲܵ_ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ௝,ொଵ,௟௔௦௧ െ ܧܲܵ_ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ௝,ொଵ,௙௜௥௦௧൯
ே
஺௡௔௟௬௦௧	௝ୀଵ
 
To make this measure more comparable across firms, we standardize the cumulative forecast revision 
by the absolute value of reported earnings. 
                                              
1 This treatment is to ensure that the earnings forecast revisions are meaningful. I/B/E/S observations tend to bias towards 
relatively large companies, and as a result 178 observations out of the 233 are lost in this treatment. 
2 The choice of 90-day period is due to the fact that the quarter-ahead earnings will be announced and there will not be any 
forecasts after this period. As robustness checks, we also run the same analysis using a 60-day period and a 30-day period. 
The sample sizes further decrease, but the results are not qualitatively changed. 
  
ܵݐܽ݊݀ܽݎ݀݅ݖ݁݀_ܴ݁ݒ݅ݏ݅݋݊௜
ൌ ቎ ෍ ൫ܧܲܵ_ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ௝,ொଵ,௟௔௦௧ െ ܧܲܵ_ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ௝,ொଵ,௙௜௥௦௧൯
ே
஺௡௔௟௬௦௧	௝ୀଵ
቏ |ܧܲ ௜ܵ,ொଵ| 
Our risk metric is the pre- to post-announcement change in the dispersion of analysts' quarter-ahead 
earnings forecasts. As in Diether et al. (2002), we take every analyst’s last forecast of the current fiscal 
quarter’s EPS in the 90-day period ending on the breach announcement date and define these 
forecasts’ standard deviation to be the pre-announcement dispersion (DispersionQ0, 90-day prior). We take 
every analyst’ last forecast of the quarter-ahead earnings in the 90-day period following the breach 
announcement and define these forecasts’ standard deviation to be the post-announcement dispersion 
(DispersionQ1, 90-day after). Both standard deviations are normalized by the respective absolute value of 
reported earnings. The change in dispersion is defined as the difference between the two dispersions: 
∆ܦ݅ݏ݌݁ݎݏ݅݋݊௜ ൌ ܦ݅ݏ݌݁ݎݏ݅݋݊ொଵ,ଽ଴ିௗ௔௬	௔௙௧௘௥ െ ܦ݅ݏ݌݁ݎݏ݅݋݊ொ଴,ଽ଴ିௗ௔௬	௣௥௜௢௥ 
where: 
ܦ݅ݏ݌݁ݎݏ݅݋݊ொଵ,ଽ଴ିௗ௔௬	௔௙௧௘௥ ൌ ܵݐ݀. ܦ݁ݒ. ሺܧܲܵ_ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ௝,ொଵ,௟௔௦௧ሻ/|ܧܲ ௜ܵ,ொଵ| 
ܦ݅ݏ݌݁ݎݏ݅݋݊ொ଴,ଽ଴ିௗ௔௬	௣௥௜௢௥ ൌ ܵݐ݀. ܦ݁ݒ. ሺܧܲܵ_ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ௝,ொ଴,௟௔௦௧ሻ/|ܧܲ ௜ܵ,ொ଴| 
The first measure of information transparency is the same as the risk metric. While some financial 
economists argue that forecast dispersion can serve as a firm risk measure (Johnson 2004), other 
studies suggest that it is a precise measure of the differences of opinion regarding firm earnings, which 
mostly reflect the information transparency of the firm (Diether et al. 2002).  
The second measure of information transparency is the pre- to post-announcement change in analysts’ 
earnings forecast accuracy: Forecast accuracy is a measure of analysts’ experience, capability, and 
complexity of coverage, as well as the clarity of the firm’s information disclosure (Clement 1999). 
Specifically, we take the analyst that is most active in covering the inflicted firm (the analyst issuing 
the most number of earnings forecasts) and study the pre- to post-announcement change in her forecast 
accuracy. Forecast accuracy, similar to the treatment in Clement (1999), is defined as the absolute 
difference between the last forecast the analyst issues for a fiscal period and the reported earnings for 
that fiscal period, normalized by the absolute value of the reported earnings. That is, for inflicted firm 
i, assuming the most active analyst is k, the change of accuracy for firm i is defined as: 
∆ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௜ ൌ ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐܧݎݎ݋ݎொଵ,ଽ଴ିௗ௔௬	௔௙௧௘௥ െ ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐܧݎݎ݋ݎொ଴,ଽ଴ିௗ௔௬	௣௥௜௢௥ 
where: 
ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐܧݎݎ݋ݎொଵ,ଽ଴ିௗ௔௬	௔௙௧௘௥ ൌ |ܰܧ_ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ௞,ொଵ,௟௔௦௧ െ ܰܧ௜,ொଵ|/|ܰܧ௜,ொଵ| 
ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐܧݎݎ݋ݎொ଴,ଽ଴ିௗ௔௬	௣௥௜௢௥ ൌ |ܰܧ_ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ௞,ொ଴,௟௔௦௧ െ ܰܧ௜,ொ଴|/|ܰܧ௜,ொ଴| 
 
4 PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
In Table 1, we provide the descriptive statistics of the final sample of 174 breach cases, 870 firm-
quarter observations. We summarize the following two groups of variables in two separate panels: 
Panel A presents firm-specific variables (which include control variables to be employed in regression 
analyses to follow) and Panel B presents breach incident-specific variables.  
We observe that the average firm in our sample has a book total asset of $109 billion, book total equity 
of $22 billion, market value of total equity of $27 billion, and in the quarter during which the breach 
incident is publicly announced a net earnings of $404 million. In addition, on a per share diluted basis, 
  
net quarterly earnings excluding extraordinary items is $0.51, and earnings including extraordinary 
items is $0.55. 3 
Table 1               Descriptive Statistics - Panel B: Breach Characteristics 
                                              
3 In describing the smaller sample (57 cases) with the analyst earnings forecast requirement, we find little qualitative 
difference in variables between this smaller sample and the final sample as in Table 2, except the smaller sample have larger 
firm size in terms of total assets and market value. 
Variable Unit N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. 
1st 
Quartile Median 
3rd 
Quartile Max 
Total Assets $Billion 174 108.7 366.7 0.03 2.0 8.9 44.3 2364.5 
Total Book 
Equity $Billion 67 21.7 43.2 -3.6 0.7 2.8 15.5 233.2 
Total Market 
Value of Equity $Billion 143 26.7 56.8 0.006 1.4 5.5 24.1 393.0 
Total Long-Term 
Debt $Billion 169 18.5 64.9 0.00 0.2 1.8 7.5 490.1 
Total Cash $Billion 128 2.0 4.0 0.00 0.1  0.3 1.6 25.7 
Current Quarter 
Total Net 
Earnings $Billion 174 0.4 1.0 -2.8 0.01 0.1  0.3 5.0 
Current Quarter 
EPS before 
Extraordinary 
Items $ 174 0.51 1.00 -2.40 0.15 0.36 0.71 7.31 
Current Quarter 
EPS including 
Extraordinary 
Items $ 174 0.55 1.02 -2.40 0.17 0.37 0.74 7.31 
 
Table 1.              Descriptive Statistics - Panel A: Firm Characteristics 
Variable Unit N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. 
1st 
Quartile Median 
3rd 
Quartile Max 
Time lag from 
customer 
notification to 
public 
announcement # days 174 7.76 34.65 -8 0 0 1 364 
 
Severity (# of 
transaction 
records breached 
in an incident) 
#  
Records 80 151642.29 958103 1.00 121 1500 21000 8500000 
 
Dummy variable: 
Malicious 
(accident 0; 
malicious 
attack1) 1 or 0 174 0.60 0.49 0 0 1 1 1 
 
Dummy variable: 
Sensitivity 
(confidential data 
1 otherwise 0) 1 or 0 174 0.89 0.32 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
  
We further conduct univariate analyses on each of the aforementioned measures to examine our 
empirical predictions. Table 2 presents the three profitability measures. First, as the first column 
suggests, we find that on average, the cumulative change in net earnings including extraordinary items 
in the four quarters following a breach announcement is a 22.54% decrease, indicating deteriorated 
earnings performance. The distribution of the cumulative change is rather symmetric, with the median 
value being exactly 0%. With a very large standard deviation within the 174 cases, a two-tail test 
yields a t-statistic of -0.43 and fails to reject the null hypothesis that there is no change from the breach 
current quarter to four quarters following the breach announcement. As an interesting contrast, in the 
second column we present the cumulative change in net earnings excluding extraordinary items in the 
four quarters following a breach announcement and find an average 87.84% increase. The distribution 
of this change variable is heavily skewed towards the positive end and the t-statistic, though lacking 
statistical significance, is a more pronounced 1.05. The different findings from these two columns 
suggest that although a breach does impose a financial expense to the inflicted firms, the cost of a 
security breach most likely stems from the direct cost including damage compensation and litigation 
rather than indirect cost including cost due to damaged reputation, reduced market share, and sales 
etc.. This is because damage compensation and litigation are normally categorized as extraordinary 
items and when the extraordinary expenses are excluded, the cumulative change in net earnings 
actually increased, albeit not statistically significant. 
The last column of Table 2 is the cumulative analyst revision of their earnings forecasts about the 
inflicted firms for the following quarter. We document an average of 15.26% increase in forecast 
revisions, though statistically insignificant, which indicate a slightly increased optimism among 
analysts regarding the inflicted firms’ post-breach earnings performance. This phenomenon may have 
two explanations. First, analysts’ forecast is more about the “street earnings” number that excludes 
extraordinary items and focuses on the main line of business that generates revenue. Thus consistent 
with the findings from the cumulative change in net earnings, the upward revisions from the analysts 
suggest that they in general do not believe that a security breach will impact the breached firm's main 
line of business. In other words, they do not believe that a security breach will lead to indirect cost 
including damaged reputation, decreased sales and market share etc. Second, the company’s 
acknowledgement of breach and offered means to mitigate the effect of breach actually result in an 
improved confidence in the company’s future earnings performance.  
Measure Cumulative Change in 
Net Earnings 
Cumulative Change in Earnings 
before Extraordinary Items 
Financial Analysts' 
Cumulative Earnings 
Forecast Revision 
N of obs. 174 174 57 
Mean -22.54% 87.84% 15.26% 
Std. Dev. 695.98% 1100.24% 380.91% 
Min. -7501.35% -3411.11% -1400.00% 
1st Quartile -46.74% -38.24% -17.00% 
Median 0.00% 5.57% 23.00% 
3rd Quartile 43.70% 48.15% 70.00% 
Max 2800.00% 13300.00% 1354.00% 
t-statistics of 
Two-tail test -0.43 1.05 0.30 
Table 2. Profitability Measures: All three measures are standardized by the current quarter 
respective earnings 
Table 3 combines the risk measure and information transparency measure and presents the change in 
analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion and accuracy. As argued previously, the dispersion of forecasts 
may represent the business risk of a firm as well as the quality and transparency of information that the 
firm provides. In the first column, we observe a statistically significant increase in forecast dispersion 
  
from the 90-day period prior to the breach announcement to the 90-day period after the announcement. 
On average, the post-breach dispersion is 19.14% larger as a percentage of the actual earnings, 
illustrating a higher business risk perceived by professional investors (represented by analysts) or a 
less transparent information environment due to the chain effect following a breach or the lack of 
agreement regarding the scale, severity and influence of the breach incident itself.  
As we compare the pre-breach and post-breach forecast error of the most active analysts following an 
inflicted firm, expertise and personal experience are naturally controlled for, and the comparison of 
forecast error is directly related with the most active analysts’ perception and interpretation of the 
signals regarding the inflicted firm’s earnings. We document that while the overall information seems 
less transparent after the data breach announcement and hence more disagreement among analysts, the 
most active analyst seems to be able to detect more accurate information regarding the inflicted firm’s 
earnings and thus able to reduce his forecast error in the post-breach announcement period. An 
average of 13.30% reduction in the forecast error from the 90-day period prior to the breach 
announcement to the 90-day period after the announcement is observed. This finding of improved 
accuracy from the most active analyst, together with the deteriorated information transparency, poses a 
conjecture that breach announcement may conveys more uncertainty and invites more diverse 
interpretation of the breach’s impact on earnings, but it also contains specific information regarding 
the scale of the impact on earnings that only analysts who actively follow the company and have 
expertise in understanding the cost of the breach incident can decipher and incorporate to improve 
their forecast accuracy. In other words, more sophisticated analysts have the potential to add value in 
estimating the real cost of a data security breach.    
     
Measure Change in Financial Analysts' Quarterly Earnings Forecast 
Dispersion 
Change in Financial Analysts' Quarterly 
Earnings Forecast Accuracy 
N of obs. 51 57 
Mean 19.14% -13.30% 
Std. Dev. 73.50% 68.43% 
Min. 0.00% -450.00% 
1st Quartile 1.78% -12.02% 
Median 4.45% -4.30% 
3rd Quartile 7.80% 2.62% 
Max 522.81% 196.79% 
t-statistics of Two-tail test 1.86 -1.47 
 
Table  3. Risk and Information Transparency Measures: The original dispersion and accuracy 
variables used to construct both measures are standardized by corresponding 
earnings. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
To this end, this research yields several interesting and encouraging findings. First, confirming the 
findings of some prior studies, our preliminary univariate analyses illustrate multiple evidence of the 
negative effect breach incidents have on profitability, risk and information transparency. However, the 
employment of multiple measures enables a fuller and richer understanding on the economic 
implication of data security breach incidents. Specifically, the financial damage of a data security 
breach mostly likely stems from direct cost including damage compensation and litigation rather than 
indirect costs including tarnished reputation, decreased sales and market share etc. Second, in addition 
  
to its direct cost, data security breaches also negatively impact the perceived risk of the breached firm 
and the transparency of the firm’s information disclosure environment. Finally, more sophisticated 
analysts have the potential to add value in estimating the real cost of a data security breach. Despite 
these intriguing findings, future research could consider (1) comparing all profitability, risk and 
information environment measures with the industry median value and (2) running regressions that 
attempt to explain the direction and scale of profitability and risk change by the attributes of the firm, 
analysts, and the data breach incidents.  
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